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Unifying the Law of Impossibility
By J. BARRIGAN MARCANTONIO
B.A., Harvard University, J.D., Georgetown University, Fellow, Max-Planck-
Institut, Munich.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods' (Convention), an attempt to unify the law concerning
international sales of goods, was announced on April 10, 1980. The
Convention is the latest step in a process which has been under way since
before 1930,2 and is the direct descendent of the Hague Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods International legal scholars anticipate
more widespread acceptance of the Convention due to the substantive
improvements over its predecessor as well as the wider representation the
Convention enjoyed in its drafting.4
There are various yardsticks for judging the success of a uniform
law. The first is the extent to which the law represents a true compro-
mise in approach. Does the new legislation adopt formulations from the
wide variety of legal systems represented in its drafting? Such compro-
mise is important because it enables concerned parties (Le. parties to a
contract, attorneys and judges) to understand and apply the uniform law.
A second yardstick is the result of application of the uniform law. Re-
gardless of method, does application of the uniform law produce legal
1. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex 1 (Apr. 10, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
2. For a summary of the history of the unification of the law of international sales of
goods, see Historical Introduction to the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97.5 (Mar. 14, 1980); Honnold, The Draft Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L 223 (1979);
KOMMENTAR ZUM EiNHErr.ICHEN KAuFREcHT, at xxxi-xxxvii (H. D81le ed. 1976).
3. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (with an-
nex), opened for signature July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 122, 1 U.N. Register of Trade Law Texts
39 [hereinafter cited as Hague Law]. It has been ratified or acceded to by Belgium, Gambia,
Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, San Marino, the United King-
dom and Northern Ireland.
4. See Hermann, The Contribution of UNCITRAL to the Development of International
Trade Law, in THE TRANSNAmIONAL LAW Op INTERNATIONAL CO.MMERCIAL TRAN AC-
nONS 35, 38 (Horn & Schmitthoff eds. 1983) [hereinafter cited as TRANSNATIONAL LAWV].
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consequences which correspond to the various concepts of justice of the
legal systems represented in its drafting? This is important in convincing
parties to choose (or at least not to exclude) the uniform law to govern
their transactions. The success of uniform law can also be judged
pragmatically, based on the contribution it makes to the goal of legal
unification. Has the law been adopted by a significant number of coun-
tries, thereby assisting in the creation of a truly transnational law of in-
ternational commercial transactions? 5
It is too early to tell whether the Convention will contribute to the
creation of transnational law by gaining wide acceptance.6 Comparative
legal analysis, however, can be applied to the Convention to determine
whether the law is successful in terms of the other two criteria: first,
whether the law represents a formula which blends various legal ap-
proaches and is thus comprehensible to parties from a wide variety of
legal backgrounds; and, second, whether results obtained from its appli-
cation will be acceptable to members of varying legal systems.
This Article focuses on the Convention's regulation of situations in
which a party to a contract is unable to perform because performance has
become "impossible." 7 Various elements of both common law (from An-
glo-American principles) and Continental civil law (from German princi-
ples)8 will be considered. The Convention's regulation of breach of
contract and impossibility represents a hybrid of both common- and
civil-law approaches. In general, the Convention will impose or limit
liability for breach in a manner acceptable to jurists from both systems.
5. For a discussion of transnational law, see Horn, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law
of International Commercial Contracts, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 3-18;
Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions, id.
at 19-31; Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mer-
catoria), 19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978).
6. Although by December 1984 only 6 nations had ratified the Convention, acceptance
of a uniform law takes time. The predecessor of the Convention, the Hague Law, was opened
for signature on July 1, 1964, but did not enter into force until August 18, 1972, when it was
finally ratified by five nations.
7. The term "impossibility" has been used in this paper to avoid confusion. The doctrine
discussed has many labels in Anglo-American law, including "acts of God," "force majeure"
and "frustration." The term "frustration" has been avoided since it is used to describe both
impossibility and situations where performance is not impossible, but has merely become com-
mercially futile. Such latter cases are also called "frustration of the venture" and have their
origin in the "Coronation Cases." For a discussion of this doctrine, see CALAMARI & PE-
RILLO, CONTRACrS, §§ 3-10 (1981); TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT, at 591-93 (4th ed.
1975); 18 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 1954 (3d ed. 1979),
8. The term "German law," as used in this analysis, refers to the German Civil Code and
doctrines arising therefrom. It does not refer to the Hague Law, although this law has been
ratified by Germany, and has been effective in Germany since April 16, 1974. BUROERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [BGB] 11146, 148 (1974) (W. Ger.).
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When measured by the compromise and result yardsticks the Convention
is thus a success.
IH. INITIAL DIFFICULTIES
A. Reconciling Two Legal Systems
Those drafting a uniform law are confronted with the difficult task
of adopting characteristics from legal systems which are often concep-
tually worlds apart and then integrating them into an independent, work-
able and meaningful system of regulation. To synthesize civil- and
common-law principles is difficult. Because civil-law systems are based
upon codes which contain short, precise paragraphs, they must necessar-
ily classify, divide and categorize. Common-law systems, on the other
hand, are not confined to numbered paragraphs which claim to regulate
all legal relations and events. Thus, the common law can be much more
general, and can set forth principles which will be further modified and
applied in a practical fashion to later cases.'
Although the application of civil or common law to any particular
case may produce similar results, the paths leading to the results will
often be completely different; the civil-law lawyer will ask many ques-
tions which never occur to the common-law lawyer. The dichotomy be-
tween private and public law, or between civil and commercial law, for
example, might not interest the common-law lawyer, whereas the distinc-
tion would be crucial to the civil-law lawyer."
The law of contracts presents one of the widest conceptual gaps be-
tween civil- and common-law systems. The law applicable to contracts
in Germany is called the law of obligations (Schuldrecht). It deals with
each person's duty to perform separate undertakings. Schuldrecht is not
limited to contractual relations, but also applies in areas which would fall
within the common-law fields of tort or property law. Each of these un-
dertakings is regulated separately, and there are additional provisions
regulating the possible relation or interdependence of the two parties'
duties. German law, however, neither assumes nor requires that a bind-
9. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the more "general" common-
law system, see Rechtsvergleichung - Zur neueren Entwicklung des Vertragsrechts in Europa,
Report of the Max-Planck-Institut f'dr ausliindisches und internationales Privatrecht,
Hamburg, in GUTACHTEN UND VORSCHIXGE ZUR UBERARBEITUNG DES SCHULDRSCI, 1
BUNDESMINISTER DER JusTIz 59, 60 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Max-Planck-Institut Re-
port]. See also Weitnauer, Vertragsaufhebung und Schadensersatz nach dem einheitllchen
Kaufgesetz und nach geltendem deutschen Recht, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG UND RECrr-
svEREiHErrLiCHUNG 71, at 112-13 (Wahl, Serrick & Niederlander eds. 1967).
10. See Max-Planck-Institut Report, supra note 9, at 60.
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ing obligation consist of two interdependent performances or promises to
perform. 1'
B. Defining Terms
An additional problem in comparative legal synthesis is the under-
standing of basic terms. This is caused by the conceptual disparity be-
tween different systems and is aggravated by problems of translation. An
underlying conceptual similarity between two systems may be uninten-
tionally veiled by the use of different terms. In the same way, a concep-
tual gap between the two systems may be veiled by the use of identical
terms. The law of contracts presents difficulties in this respect. In order
to understand the comparative analysis of the doctrine of impossibility,
key terms must be defined and discussed. The two most important terms
are breach and damages.
1. Breach of Contract
To a common-law lawyer, the term breach is a very broad one.
Breach includes every case in which a contracting party's actual perform-
ance differs from that which was originally promised, no matter how in-
significant the deviation and regardless of whether the actual
performance is just as valuable to the promisee as that which was prom-
ised.12 In sales contracts, breach includes cases which would be handled
under various doctrines by a civil-law lawyer, including cases where the
promisor fails to deliver, delivers late, delivers to the wrong location,
delivers the wrong amount, delivers goods with legal or physical defects,
delivers goods different from those promised or fails to perform one of
his incidental duties to the contract (for example, packaging, insurance
or transport). While the common-law concept of breach may be further
broken down into categories such as "fundamental" or "anticipatory," a
finding of any breach is sufficient for legal consequences to attach under
common-law principles. In general, any breach entitles the nonbreach-
ing party to damages. Even a breach which results in no harm to the
promisee gives rise to a claim for nominal damages. 3 Although substan-
tial or fundamental breach is required for avoidance of the contract, all
11. See, eg., the doctrines of commission (Auftrag) BGB §§ 662-76; loan (Lelhe) BOB
§§ 598-606; and bailment (Verwahrung) BGB §§ 688-700. These three doctrines may all be
considered "considerationless" contracts.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1981); 12 WILLISTON, supra note 7,
§ 1454 (1970); 11 id. § 1339A (1968).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 346 (1981); 2 WILLISTON, supra note 7,
§ 223 (1959); 11 id. § 1339A (1968); TREITEL, supra note 7, at 617.
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breaches are considered substantial in contracts for the sale of goods. 14
The common-law concept of breach most nearly corresponds to the
German legal term Leistungsstdrungen or irregularities in performance."5
In contrast to the common law, however, a finding of an irregularity in
performance (breach) must be further differentiated before legal conse-
quences such as damages can be determined. The major types of breach
traditionally recognized in German civil law are delay (Verzug), impossi-
bility (Unm6glichkeit) and warranty liability for defects in goods
(Sachmdngelhaftung). Because of the difficulty of fitting all cases of
breach into these categories, two other broad doctrines of breach were
developed. Although grounded on principles contained in the German
Civil Code (Bzfrgerliches Gesetzbuch or 3GB), these new doctrines were
developed by legal scholars and judges. They include faulty performance
of incidental contractual duties (Schlechterfzillung einer vertrdglichen
Nebenpflicht) and disappearance of the basis of the transaction (Weg/all
der Geschdeftsgrundlage).'6
The civil-law doctrines set out above fit under the general common-
law rubric of breach. 7 They do not, however, necessarily give rise to
causes of action for damages under German civil law. Thus, a German
lawyer, in analyzing a case of late delivery which does not result in sub-
stantial harm to the promisee, or in analyzing a case of breach of implied
warranty, might conclude that such irregularities in performance do not
constitute a breach because they do not entitle the promisee to an action
for damages."8 For the purposes of this Article, breach will be used in its
expansive common-law sense.
14. This "perfect tender" rule has been embodied in Section 2-601 of the United States
Uniform Commercial Code, which allows a buyer to avoid the contract "if the goods or the
tender of delivery fails in any respect to conform to the contract" (emphasis added). U.C.C
§ 2-601 (1977).
15. EMMERiCH, DAs RECHT DER LEISTUNGSST6RUNrEN 2-3 (1978).
16. The first doctrine is divided into two subcategories: positive breach of contract (paxs-
tive ertragsverletzung) or culpa in contrahendo. The second doctrine is equivalent to the com-
mon-law doctrine of frustration of the venture, discussed supra note 7. For a good discussion
in English of these various theories, see HoRN, KoTz & LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COM-
MERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 107-109, 141-143 (1982).
17. One category of faulty performance of incidental contractual duties, culpa in con-
trahendo, would not be treated as a contractual problem under common law. An example of
such a case would be where a shopper in a grocery store fell on a banana peel which was lying
on the floor of an aisle. Such a case would be a tort problem at common law. For a discussion
of the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, see HoRN, Korz & LESER, supra note 16, at 108, 159;
see also ZWEIGERT & KoTz, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLFICHUNG 354-355 (1969).
18. Breach of implied warranty gives rise only to avoidance or reduction of the price
(Wandelung or Minderung). Damages are available only for breach of an express warranty.
BGB §§ 459-463.
1984]
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The Convention generally adopts the common-law system of a sin-
gle, "uniform" breach. Any type of breach gives rise to a cause of action
for damages along with the other remedies to which a party may be enti-
tled.19 This initial similarity between the Convention and common law,
although important, should not obscure civil-law influences or lead to the
misconception that the common law and Convention are identical on this
point. The Convention's system of regulation, in line with German con-
tract law, is more cautious than the common law in permitting avoid-
ance.20 The Convention provides a more flexible approach to confirming
the contract, either by allowing faulty performance to be remedied, or by
denying avoidance and compensating merely with damages.2 A good
example of this flexibility is the grace period, or Nachfrist, which serves
two purposes: to allow a dilatory party more time to perform and to
delay avoidance.22 The categorization of different types of breaches
under German law also fulfills these purposes: the contract is confirmed
in cases of breach where to do so would not cause great harm to the
promisee and the faulty performer is allowed an opportunity to remedy,
or must somehow compensate for his faulty performance. Thus, the ini-
tial impression that the Convention breach is identical to the common-
law breach is not correct. It would be more accurate to say that the
Convention approach is based upon a common-law principle of damages
for all breaches but tempered with the civil-law characteristic of more
flexible remedies.
2. Damages
The common-law concept of damages may also be seen as "uni-
form." In all cases of breach an award is given to put the innocent party
in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed.
This compensation includes lost profits or the "benefit of the bargain"
19. Convention, supra note 1, art. 45 (seller's breach), art. 61 (buyer's breach).
20. The contract may only be avoided in cases of "fundamental" breach (as defined in id.
art. 25) or in cases other than fundamental breach, only if a party fails to perform after the
lapsing of a grace period; id. at art. 49 (for seller's breach), art. 64 (for buyer's breach).
21. Id. Examples of the flexible remedies contained in the Convention are: the claim for
substitute goods (art. 46(2)); claim for repair of nonconforming goods (art. 46(3)); and a right
to reduce the price for nonconforming goods (art. 50).
22. There are actually two types of grace periods provided in the Convention. The first
type (from the German Nachfrist) applies to both buyer (art. 47) and seller (art. 63), This
grace period for a reasonable length of time must be accorded a nonperforming party in cases
of nonfundamental breach before the contract may be avoided (art. 49(1)(b) for avoidance by
the buyer; art. 64 (1)(b) for avoidance by the seller). In addition, there is a second type of
grace period written into the law. According to Article 48, the seller is accorded a right to
perform in certain cases even after the date for delivery. Id.
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plus all other losses arising out of the breach,' but is limited by a re-
quirement of foreseeability 4 As mentioned previously, if the innocent
party suffers no losses as a result of the breach, nominal damages will be
awarded. 5
There is no corresponding general theory of damages which applies
in all cases of breach in German law. Instead, two major methods of
calculating recovery are used depending upon the type of breach in-
volved.26 The first of these measures corresponds to common-law dam-
ages. It seeks to place the injured party in the same economic condition
he would have been in had the contract been performed and is called
"performance" (Erfz'llungs) or "positive" interest damages (positives In-
teresse). This measure of damages is the rule in cases of breach where
damages are awarded.' 7
The second measure of damages provided for by German law is cal-
culated independently of both lost profits and contract price and is equal
to the expenditures the innocent party has made in reliance upon the
contract." It therefore seeks to put the nonbreaching party not in the
position he would have been in had the contract been performed but
rather in the position he was in before he started to negotiate. In order to
emphasize the purpose of compensating reliance losses and denial of lost
profits, this measure is called negative (Negatives) or reliance interest
damages (Vertrauensinteresse). This measure of damages is awarded less
frequently. It is not viewed conceptually as contract damages by Ger-
man jurists since it is awarded in cases where either the contract is con-
sidered void ab initio, or where existence of the contract is irrelevant3"
23. Robinson v. Harman, 154 Eng. Rep. 365, 367 (1848); Lieberman v. Templar Motors
Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923); see also TRErrEL, supra note 7, at 623; CAANLUU &
PERILLO, supra note 7, at 521; 11 WILLLSTON, supra note 7, §§ 1338, 1339 (1968).
24. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
25. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The awarding of nominal damages has
merely symbolic value and was created to satisfy the jurist's desire for symmetry, le. damages
in all cases of breach.
26. For a discussion of the further, or "maintenance', damages (Erhaltungsintereze)
which are awarded in cases of positive breach of contract, see KoPcK , TYPEN DER PosmvEN
VERTRAGSVERLErZUNG 133 (1965).
27. It is the more common measure of damages in cases of impossibility (BGB §§ 280,
325) and is awarded in cases of delay (BGB § 326), breach of express warranty (BGB § 463)
and in certain cases of positive breach of contract. BGH NAV 1969, 975; MDicus,
BURGERLICHEs RcT, § 14 IV 2 (1981).
28. For further discussion of this measure of damages, see BGB § 122 (for cases of rectifi-
cation (Anfechtung)) and BGB § 307 (for cases of initial objective impossibility). This measure
of damages is also awarded in cases of culpa in contrahendo. 1 LARENZ, LU-iRBUCH DES
SCHULDRECHFTS, § 9 I 3 (12th ed. 1979).
29. The contract is considered void ab initio both in cases of initial objective impossibility
19841
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This negative interest may be awarded in certain impossibility fact pat-
terns where Anglo-American law would award damages and is therefore
relevant to this analysis.
The Convention's general provision for damages is contained in Ar-
ticle 82. There is only one measure of damages which corresponds to
common-law damages and civil-law positive interest damages. 30 Article
82 provides that damages for a breach of contract by one party shall
consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the
other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may not ex-
ceed the losses foreseeable to the breaching party at the time the con-
tract was entered into, in light of the facts and circumstances which the
breaching party then knew or ought to have known.
III. THE LAW OF IMPOSSIBILITY
As was seen above, the civil- and common-law systems of regulation
are conceptually very different. This civil law/common law disparity is
also apparent in the civil- and common-law impossibility doctrines. At
first glance, the civil-law lawyer appears to analyze cases by classifying
them according to various criteria which appear superfluous to the com-
mon-law lawyer. On the other hand, the common-law lawyer seems to
have renounced all attempts to analyze and, so it would seem to the civil-
law lawyer, merely produces a result (i.e., liable or not liable) without
analytical guidelines. Both would be precipitous in their judgments of
the other's system.
A. Scope of the Law
The role of the doctrine of impossibility in both the civil and the
common law must be examined to fully understand the synthesizing task
the Convention drafters faced. Analysis must not be limited to an exami-
nation of the individual provisions dealing with impossibility without
first looking at the broader perspective, because the two systems of regu-
lation begin from different starting points.
(BGB § 306) and in cases of rectification (BGB § 119). In cases of culpa in contrahendo,
whether a contract actually arises out of the precontractual dealings is irrelevant to the cause
of action or the calculation of damages.
30. The measure of "negative damages" was specifically rejected in the formulation of tile
predecessor of the Convention, the Hague Law; see KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN
KAuFr cHT, supra note 2, at 463. Since according to the Convention formulation damages
are based upon "loss," nominal damages are apparently not available.
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1. Civil-Law Impossibility: The German Example
Under the German approach, the first determination upon breach is
whether performance is still physically possible for the promisor. If so, a
case of "delay" is presented and specific performance will be available.
Costs caused by the delay will be reimbursed,31 or if performance is no
longer valuable to the innocent party due to the delay, damages will be
awarded.32 The civil-law doctrine of "impossibility"33 deals with those
cases of breach where performance is no longer physically possible for
the promisor, Le., where the primary claim for specific performance
would be meaningless.34 The scope of this doctrine is thus much broader
than its common-law counterpart. Perhaps to the surprise of a common-
law lawyer, the following examples would all fall under the civil-law doc-
trine of impossibility.
Example 1
Seller (S) sells identified goods to Buyer (B), which are in transport at
the time of contracting. Unknown to either party, the ship upon which
the goods were loaded sank without a trace the day before contracting. S
is unable to deliver the promised goods and breaches his contract with B.
A suit against S for specific performance would be meaningless.
Example 2
S sells a car to B which he has not yet bought from the true owner T.
When S approaches T to buy the car, it turns out that T is not interested
in selling at any price. S is unable to deliver the promised car and
breaches his contract with B. A suit for specific performance against S
would be meaningless.
Example 3
S sells his car to B, to be delivered in the future. Two days before deliv-
31. BGB § 286(1). These damages are analogous to those awarded for positive breach of
contract; see supra note 27.
32. BGB §§ 286(2), 326(2).
33. German law actually recognizes two terms: Unm~glichkeit and Unvermgen. These
have been translated in this paper as objective and subjective impossibility respectively.
34. Specific performance plays a much larger conceptual role in German law. In cases of
breach, the law does not immediately turn to substitutional remedies, such as damages, but has
recourse first to a claim for performance. Contrary to common law, specific performance is
not an exceptional remedy, and is generally available to a nonbreaching party unless perform.
ance is impossible. This is based upon the Roman law principle that the law does not require
performance of the impossible, jimpossibilium nulla est obligato. For an excellent comparative
legal treatment of specific performance, see ZWEIGERT & KorZ supra note 17, at 162-168.
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ery, S receives a better offer for the car, and sells and delivers the same
car to C. S is unable to deliver the promised car to B and thereby
breaches his contract with B. A suit for specific performance against S
would be meaningless.
2. Common-Law Impossibility
The doctrine of impossibility is applied in far fewer cases in Anglo-
American systems. As in the civil law, performance must be physically
impossible for the nonperforming party. Additionally, the nonperform-
ing party must not have been in any way involved in the circumstances
causing the impossibility; such events must have been beyond the control
of the nonperforming party. This "control" facet of common-law impos-
sibility is not expressly emphasized in common-law analysis. It is gener-
ally not considered as one of the prerequisites for application of the
impossibility doctrine.35 Nonetheless, it is an inherent requirement.
Where events causing impossibility were within the control of the
nonperforming party, the impossibility doctrine will not be applied and
the party will remain liable.36 Thus, a party is liable for any event which
was within his control. The requirement that the impossibility be caused
by outside forces is made clear from the traditional labels of common-law
impossibility: force majeure and acts of God.
Additionally, common-law impossibility is present only when it is
shown that the nonperforming party did not expressly or implicitly agree
to assume the risk of impossibility caused by outside forces.37 The more
restrictive scope of common-law impossibility also fails to include any
case where performance was impossible at the time of contracting, de-
spite the fact that such impossibility was beyond the control and not
within the scope of the risks assumed by the nonperforming party. Such
situations are governed by the common-law doctrine of mistake. 38
35. See, e.g., CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, at 478. Perhaps it would be better to
say that the questions presented are: (1) Was there an unexpected event? (2) Did that event
make performance impossible or impracticable? (3) Upon whom should the risk of the unex-
pected contingency be visited?
36. This may be labelled "self-induced frustration," Bank Line Ltd. v. Arthur Capel &
Co., 1919 A.C. 435, 452. Or damages may be denied on the basis of considerations ofjustice,
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, at 501. This principle is discussed in Williston under the
title of "fault." What is truly important is that the promisor himself shall be free from fault.
On the other hand, impossibility because of an act of God will not necessarily excuse perform-
ance since there may be an agreed assumption of risk. 18 WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 1936
(1978).
37. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944); see generally TREITEL, supra
note 7, at 593; 18 WILLISTON, supra note 7, §§ 1934, 1972A (1978).
38. For a general discussion of the doctrine of mistake, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
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In comparing the scopes of the civil- and common-law impossibility
doctrines, all three of the civil-law examples given above fall outside the
scope of the common-law doctrine. The first example is the classic mis-
take case. The second and third examples would not be considered ex-
amples of impossibility, for in both cases the events causing the
impossibility were within the control of the nonperforming party.
Although the civil and common law differ in scope, the results of their
application are roughly the same. While German law applies its doctrine
of impossibility in many more cases, application of the impossibility doc-
trine does not necessarily relieve a party of liability. The common-law
doctrine is applied more restrictively but relieves liability in all cases.
3. Convention Impossibility
The Convention deals with impossibility in Article 79, entitled "Ex-
emptions." Article 79 provides that a party is not liable for a failure to
perform contractual obligations if he or she can prove that the failure
was due to an impediment beyond his or her control and that he or she
could not reasonably be expected either to have taken the impediment
into account at the time of contracting or to have avoided its conse-
quences. The scope of the new provision more closely resembles com-
mon-law impossibility. Its application is limited to cases where
nonperformance is due to an impediment "beyond the control" of the
nonperforming party and where the impediment was not within the
scope of the party's assumed risks. In contrast to the common law, the
control aspect is express and emphasized in the Convention.
In the civil-law examples cited earlier, the Convention, like the com-
mon law, would apply neither to a case where a seller enters into two
contracts for the sale of the same car (Example 3), nor to a case where
the seller sells a car which he or she only hopes to acquire but does not
yet own (Example 2). In each of these cases, not only is the impediment
within the seller's control but the seller could also have been expected to
have taken the impediment into account or to have avoided it.
The Convention, like the civil law, applies to cases where the imped-
iment existed at the time of conclusion of the contract (Le., common-law
cases of mistake). This was made clear in the drafting reports on Article
note 7, at 299-311, 498-499; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) oF CoNTRAcTS § 502 (1932). This con-
ceptual difference between initial "mistake" and subsequent "impossibility" has been aban-
doned by the Second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 266
(1981).
19841
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79, and in the official commentary.39 Also, like the civil law, Article 79 is
applicable in cases of defects in goods and cases of partial impossibility.40
Thus, the Convention combines aspects of both common- and civil-law
impossibility in one uniform regulation and is a compromise between the
common and the civil law. The regulation includes within its scope more
cases than at common law but fewer than at civil law.
B. Approach of the Impossibility Laws
As discussed above, German law applies the impossibility doctrine
in all cases of breach where the party owing performance is unable to
perform. In such cases, German law conclusively presumes that the
promisee's claim for specific performance is extinguished.41 German law
then examines a variety of factors to determine whether the nonperform-
ing party should remain liable for the breach. These factors include the
following:
1. Initial or Subsequent Impossibility
Was performance of the contract impossible at the time the parties
contracted to perform? Since a party is better able to guarantee his pres-
ent capability to perform than his future capability,42 a nonperforming
party is held to stricter liability in cases of initial impossibility.
2. Subjective or Objective Impossibility
Would performance be impossible for anyone or is it impossible only
39. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, prepared by the Secretariat, U. N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5, art. 65, Nr.4 (1980).
40. On the question of defects in goods, see Kirchhof, Die Sachmiingelhaftung nach deut-
schem recht im Vergleich zur Haftung fir vertragswidrige Sachen nach dem Einheitliclhen
Gesetz fiber den internationalen Kauf beweglicher Sachen 275-277 (Munich 1970, unpublished
dissertation); SWIEGERT & KoTz, supra note 17, at 219; KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICIIE1N
KAUFRECIrr, supra note 2, at 440 (these sources discuss the Hague Law, but their remarks are
also pertinent to the Convention). On the question of partial impossibility, see Nicholas, Force
Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 231, 234-6 (1979) (discussing both the Hague
Law and the Convention).
41. In cases of initial subjective impossibility, there is no claim for specific performance
since the contract is void ab initio (BGBI § 3061). For cases of subsequent impossibility with-
out fault, the primary claim for specific performance is expressly extinguished (BGB § 275). In
other cases, the claim is extinguished through logical analysis of the impossibility doctrine
along with the application of the Roman law principle of impossibilium nulla est obligato.
BGH NJW 1971, 2065; FIKENTSCHER, SCHULDRECHT, § 44(II)(2a) (6th ed. 1976).
42. See MEDICUS, supra note 27, at § 14 I, Nr. 285; BURGERLICHES GaSETZnUClI
[BGB] art. 306, annot. 31 (Palandt, 11th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Palandt]; 2 MoTivg
ZUM BGB, at 45, 46 (1888).
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for the nonperforming party?4 3 If a party contracts to sell his original
Picasso and it is destroyed, for example, performance is objectively im-
possible since no one on Earth could deliver the painting. A party who
sells his car twice (as in Example 3), or who sells a car he does not yet
own (as in Example 2), is only subjectively prevented from performing
since the parties with title to the cars at the time of delivery would be
able to perform. A nonperforming party is held to a higher standard of
liability in cases where performance is still humanly possible.
3. Fault of the Nonperforming Party
Who is responsible for the impossibility? Did an act or omission of
the nonperforming party cause the impossibility, did the other party to
the contract prevent performance or was neither party responsible? Gen-
erally, a party is liable only for his or her own acts or omissions. This
concept has been called the "fault" principle (Verschuldensprinzip) of
German law and it is usually pointed to as the greatest conceptual differ-
ence in the frameworks of the common- and civil-law approaches to
breaches. Civil law requires that the nonperforming party be somehow
"responsible" for a breach before it will impose damages. According to
the general civil-law view, a party will be held liable for all intentional
and negligent acts.' There are, however, liability-expanding provisons
in the German Civil Code which create absolute liability in special
cases.45 German case law also infers absolute or "guaranty" liability in
some cases such as cases of initial subjective impossibility. Finally, a
party will be liable in all cases where he expressly agreed to remain liable.
This is the case, for example, when a party agrees to deliver goods to a
region despite a war waging in that region.'
43. See BROX, 1 ALLGEMEINES SCHULDRECHT, Nrs. 225, 228 (9th ed. 1981); MEnIcUS,
supra note 27, at § 13 I la, aa; Palandt, supra note 42, at art. 275 annot. 2; FIKF wCHER,
supra note 41, at § 42 IV 1 a. For a discussion of the objective/subjective factor in common
law, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, at 497-98; 18 WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 1932
(1978); Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
44. BGB § 276.
45. Examples of such provisions are BGB § 278 (expanding liability for third parties en-
gaged to assist in performance of the contract); BGB § 279 (for cases of unidentified goods);
BGB § 287 (for cases when impossibility occurs after a party was already in breach); BGB
§ 459 (warranty liability for goods).
46. See generally KOLLER, DIE RISIKOZURECHNUNG BEI VERTRAGSSTORUNGEN IN
AUSTAUSCHVERTRAGEN (1979); see also ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 17, at 191.
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C. Regulation of Impossibility
1. Civil-Law Approach
In civil-law cases of initial impossibility (common-law mistake), two
legal conclusions are possible. If performance is objectively impossible
for this nonperforming party, e.g. if the goods to be sold have already
been destroyed, the contract is void ab initio.47 If the nonperforming
party knew or should have known of the impossibility at the time of
contracting, he or she will be liable for negative interest damages.48 In
cases where the initial impossibility is subjective, the nonperforming
party will be liable for damages in every case, regardless of fault.49 Thus,
guaranty liability for contractual performance is not unknown to Ger-
man law.
For cases of subsequent impossibility, the distinction between sub-
jective and objective is no longer material; both will be treated simi-
larly.50 In that situation, however, the question of fault plays a role. The
nonperforming party is liable for damages only when he or she is respon-
sible for the impossibility. 51 The nonperforming party is responsible for
the impossibility when the impossibility is caused by his or her inten-
tional or negligent conduct or when liability is increased by another pro-
vision of the Civil Code. An example of a liability-expanding provision is
Article 279 of the BGB, which states that a party who is obliged to sup-
ply unidentified or generic goods under a contract will be responsible for
any impossibility, regardless of fault.52 In cases of subsequent impossibil-
ity, where the nonperforming party is not at fault, and no provision cre-
ating absolute liability is applicable, the nonperforming party will not be
liable for damages for his nonperformance. 53
47. BGB § 306.
48. BGB § 307. This requirement of "knew or must have known" is similar to the fault
requirement for subsequent impossibility.
49. The case of initial subjective impossibility is not expressly covered in the BGB. Doc-
trine in this area has been developed by decision and legal commentary: Judgment of Oct. 21,
1908, Reichsgericht, Republic of Germany, 69 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivil-
sachen [RGZ] 355; Judgment of Sept. 26, 1908, Reichsgericht, Republic of Germany, 60 RGZ
247, 250; Judgment of Dec. 16, 1952, Bundesgerichtshof, Republic of Germany, 8 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 222, 231; Judgment of Oct. 28,
1953, Bundesgerichtshof, Republic of Germany, 11 BGHZ 16, 22; Palandt, supra note 42, at
art. 306 annot. 3; MEDICUS, supra note 27, at § 14 1 1; FIKENTSCHER, supra note 41, at § 43
III 4.
50. BGB § 275(2).
51. BGB §§ 280, 325.
52. For a list of other examples, see supra note 45.
53. BGB §§ 323, 324.
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2. Common-Law Approach
Comparative law specialists, in examining the civil-law approach to
cases of impossibility and to contractual liability in general, have focused
on one aspect which distinguishes and characterizes the civil-law ap-
proach: the element of fault. In contrast, common-law contract liability
is characterized as "guaranty" liability.54 Fault generally plays no role
here; the only limitations on this guaranty liability are the outer limits of
the risks deemed to have been undertaken by the parties upon con-
tracting.55 The question then is whether the nonperforming party as-
sumed the risk of the impediment occurring. If no express intent is
shown, implied intent must be inferred for liability to attach. 6
Upon a finding of impossibility, the civil-law lawyer questions
whether the nonperforming party was somehow at fault through his own
act or omission. The common-law lawyer, on the other hand, examines
the express or implied intent of the parties at the time of contracting:
when party A promised to perform, did the parties mean forA to bear the
risk that the impediment in question would occur? Examining the vari-
ous elements of the civil law and common law in detail, the two systems
are not as divergent as they appear at first glance and may be reconciled
to some extent.
First, common-law impossibility is not devoid of the element of
fault. As was briefly outlined above, there is an implied requirement in
the common law that the promisor not be responsible for the event which
makes performance impossible if the promisor is to escape liability. That
is, the promisor will not be excused from guaranty liability unless the
impossibility was beyond his or her control. This control element of
common-law impossibility performs the same function as the German
fault concept. For example, where a seller is prevented from supplying
goods sold due to the destruction of the goods through the seller's own
54. See KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHETLICHEN KAuFRECHT, supra note 2, at 439-40;
ZWEIGERT & KOTz7, supra note 17, at 217; SCHLECHTRIEM, EINHaciHF.s UN-
KAUFRECHr 95 (1981).
55. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 7, at 476; 6 CoRB N, CoRniN ON CoTAmCTS
§§ 1320-72 (1962). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS bases its doctrine on a for-
mulation borrowed from U.C.C. § 2-615 that the nonoccurrence of the impediment was a "ba-
sic assumption on which the contract was made." RESTATiENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 261-266 (1981). This determination, however, is also based upon "a judgment as to which
party assumed the risk of its occurrence." kd at 311.
56. In the original impossibility case, this was done by finding an implied term in the
contract. Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863). In the United States this method
has been abandoned, and the risk will generally be imposed by law; see CALAMAM & PEIULLO,
supra note 7, at 499; 18 WiLLisTON, supra note 7, § 1931 (1978).
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willful or negligent act, German law would view this as a case of impossi-
bility with fault, resulting in liability for damages. Anglo-American law
would not apply the impossibility doctrine to such cases because the im-
possibility was self-induced. Therefore, guaranty liability attaches, no
excuse is available and damages would be due. The fault element of Ger-
man civil law is thus contained in the common-law "control" factor.
Not only are there elements of fault inherent in the common-law
system, but guaranty and scope-of-risk elements are also found in the
German system. As discussed above, in cases of initial subjective impos-
sibility, liability for damages is owed regardless of fault. In such cases,
German law provides for guaranty liability. Guaranty elements are also
provided in the liability-expanding provisions of the Civil Code. For ex-
ample, when a promisor is unable to perform due to his own insolvency
or when he is unable to deliver generic unidentified goods, guaranty lia-
bility prevails.
Scope-of-risk reasoning is also not totally foreign to the civil law.
One facet of the principle of freedom of contract is the ability of a party
to assume risks. By expressly doing so, the party can expand liability
beyond the normal fault liability. That is, the party can agree to remain
accountable for events outside of that party's control. This may be done
by express agreement or by implied assumption of risk. Thus, where a
party is not strictly at fault for nonperformance, he or she may still be
responsible due to an assumption of the risk according to German legal
reasoning.57 Assumption of risk reasoning has often been applied in
cases where the promisee is responsible for the promisor's nonperform-
ance. Express scope-of-risk language (Risikosphdre or Risikoi'bernahme)
has been employed to expand liability beyond normal fault borders.5"
The strict conceptual demarcation between civil-law fault liability
and common-law guaranty plus scope-of-risk liability is thus not as dis-
tinct as it would initially appear. The civil law contains elements of guar-
anty liability in cases of subjective initial impossibility or in cases where
absolute liability provisions of the Civil Code apply. There are also cases
where liability will be expanded by a scope-of-risk approach. The fault
principle is not exclusively a civil-law element but it is also built into the
common-law approach. When a party is unable to perform due to his
own act or omission (i.e., fault), such impossibility will be considered to
be within his or her control and liability will attach.
57. See Nachschlagewerk des Bundesgerichtshofs [BGH LM] Nr.8 at § 325; BGH NJW
720 (1960).
58. BGH LM Nr.1 at § 324; Palandt, supra note 42, at § 25 III.; EssER, 2 ALLOEMINES
SCHULDRECHT, § 34 III 2 (5th ed. 1976); MEDICUS, supra note 27, at § 13 III, Nr.269.
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3. United Nations Convention
The Convention is based upon the more general common-law regu-
lation.59 It consists of a formula equivalent to an assumption of risk ele-
ment. In addition, the formulation also contains an express control
element. According to the language of Article 79, in order for a
nonperforming party to be relieved of liability for damages, that party
must show that:
1) the impediment was beyond his or her control;
2) he or she could not have been expected to take the impediment
into account;
3) he or she could not have been expected to avoid the impediment
or its consequences; and
4) he or she could not have been expected to overcome the impedi-
ment or its consequences.
The concepts of civil-law fault and common-law control are incor-
porated in the first requirement of Article 79. German law would find
legal fault in cases of intentional or negligent behavior. In such cases, the
impediment will not be beyond the party's control according to Article
79. The second, third and fourth requirements of Article 79 are tests for
assumption of risk, which although characterized as a common-law con-
cept, is present in both common- and civil-law systems.
As with the common-law approach, the Convention does not ad-
dress the timing, subjectivity or objectivity of the impossibility. Upon
more thorough examination, however, these considerations are all im-
plied by the wording of the paragraph; and application of common, civil
or Convention law will generally produce the same result.
59. See KOmmENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT, supra note 2, at 217;
Weitnauer, supra note 9, at 112. These sources discuss the predecessor of Article 79, namely
Article 74 of the Hague Law. The formulation of the two provisions, however, is nearly identi-
cal, and the remarks cited are applicable likewise to the Convention. It is interesting to note
that one writer (and delegate to the United Nations Convention) finds the formulation of the
two laws to be based upon the civil-law concept of fault. See Nicholas, supra note 40, at 233-
34. This seems due to a misunderstanding of the idea of fault at civil law, and a misreading of
his cited authority. Whereas he cites Stoll's contribution to the KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEIT-
UCHEN KAuFRECnT, supra note 2, in support of his statement that the Hague Law is based
upon civil-law concepts, Nicholas, supra note 40, at 233, Stolrs analysis states just the oppo-
site:
"b) Strong influence of English Law. In conformity with the avowal of Rabel, the solution
of Art. 74 is closest to the legal concepts of English Law."
"Article 74, as to its theoretical conception, is closer to foreign law - in particular :ng-
lish law - than to German law, which proceeds from a principle of fault in cases of breach
(BGB § 276) and distinguishes between legal types of breach (impossibility, delay)." KoM-
m.NTAR Zum EN NrrLicHEN KAUFRECHT, supra note 2, at 442.
19841
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
For example, no specific mention is made of initial impossibility in
the Convention language. As discussed above, German law holds a party
to a higher degree of liability for his present capability to perform than
for his future capability. This policy is found in the second requirement
of Article 79. A party cannot have been expected to take the impossibil-
ity-causing impediment into account. A party will be expected to take an
initial impediment (e.g. the sinking of the ship laden with the goods)
"into account" more than a future impediment. A further example of
German subjective impossibility that will be covered by the first, second
and third requirements of the Convention is a situation where a party
sells a car not yet acquired or sells a car which the seller no longer owns
since it has been sold to another. The sale of a car not yet owned is an
avoidable impediment and the seller will be liable for damages under the
Convention.
IV. CONCLUSION
The respective provisions of civil and common law concerning im-
possibility seem irreconcilable at first glance. This impression is mislead-
ing. While the many elements employed in an analysis of impossibility
under a civil-law approach (as exemplified by the German system) are
not expressly mentioned in the common law, the policies underlying the
civil-law elements are considered.
Common law begins with an assumption of guaranty liability, with
damages for all cases of breach. This guaranty concept also prevails in
various situations in German law where absolute liability is provided. It
was also made part of the Convention. Common-law analysis does not
expressly include the German fault concept. Nonetheless, through the
common-law requirement that impossibility not be induced by a party's
own act or omission, this fault element is present in common law. The
Convention expressly includes this concept in its requirement that an im-
pediment be beyond a party's control. Although always labelled a com-
mon-law consideration, assumption of risk reasoning is present in
German law. This concept is also the backbone of Article 79 of the
Convention.
In terms of its scope, the Convention law has adopted characteris-
tics of both systems. While initially it appears that the provision is ap-
plied in accordance with the common-law approach, the Convention
actually regulates a broader field of cases, including within its bounds,
for example, the common-law doctrine of mistake. It also applies in
cases of defects in goods and partial impossibility. The Convention
[Vol, 8
Impossibility
would satisfy the sense of justice of both the common- and the civil-law
jurist. In general, civil-law cases of impossibility with fault give rise to
claims for damages whereas cases without fault do not. At common law,
if responsibility factors similar to fault are present, legal impossibility
does not exist, and absolute liability for damages attaches. Application
of the Convention will result in similar conclusions. 60
The Convention, with its general formulation, may be interpreted
slightly differently in Germany than in England or the United States due
to the above-described methodological predispositions with which law-
yers from each system view contract liability. Thus, in examining
whether a party could have been expected to take an impediment into
account, a jurist schooled in fault liability may be more likely to excuse
nonperformance than a jurist schooled in guaranty liability. This may be
seen as a disadvantage to those concerned with achieving absolute uni-
formity in the formulation and application of law. From a pragmatic
point of view, however, some room for interpretation is necessary for any
uniform law to be acceptable to, and to correspond with, the concepts of
justice embodied in each individual system.
60. The measure of damages accorded by German law may differ from that of the Con-
vention and common law due to the fact that the civil law awards different categories of dam-
ages. However, most jurists agree that application of German and Convention Law will
produce similar results. See, e.g., KoMMENTAR ZUM ENHErruCHEN KAUrREChT, supra
note 2, at 442; ZWEIGERT AND KoTz, supra note 17, at 217; STOTrER, INTERNAToNAlES
ENHErlS-KAuFREcHT 342 (1975) (once again, sources discuss Hague Law, but remarks are
applicable to the Convention as well).
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